





RESEARCH  REPORT 0219 
DIAGNOSTIC MARKET FEEDBACK ATTENUATES 
THE BENEFITS OF ABC FOR  COMPETITIVE PRICE 
SETTING IN A HETEROGENEOUS MARKET 
by 
E.  CARDINAELS 
F.  ROODHOOFT 
L.  WARLOP 
0/2002/2376/19 Diagnostic market feedback attenuates the benefits of  ABC for competitive price 





Activity-Based Costing (ABC) is intended to assist managers to make better pricing 
decisions than those taken using traditional volume-based cost methods. The  added 
value  of ABC  should  be  assessed  against  that  of signals  emanating  from  the 
competitive environment in which the firm operates.  Prior research has often shown 
market-based  information  to  be  overwhelming,  thereby  calling  into  question  the 
wisdom of investing in cost systems to better approximate actual costs.  We compare 
experimentally  the  pricing  decisions  of decision  makers  in  a  price-competitive 
duopoly  market,  characterized  by  considerable  heterogeneity  in  customer-serving 
costs.  Our results show that the incremental value of ABC depends on the quality of 
market signals.  Decision makers receiving uninformative feedback revert to costing 
data and ABC outperforms volume-based costing.  The presence of a well-informed 
competitor attenuates but does not completely eliminate the value of  ABC. 
Eddy  Cardinaels  is  a  Ph.D.  student  in  Accounting,  Filip  Roodhooft  is  Associate  Professor  in 
Accounting, and Luk Warlop is  Associate Professor of Marketing at the K.U.Leuven. Corresponding 
author is Eddy Cardinaels, K.U.Leuven, Dept. of Applied Economics, Naamsestraat 69,3000 Leuven, 
Belgium, eddy.cardinaels@econ.kuleuven.ac.be. The authors are grateful to GustaafVan Herck and all 
participants  from  the  doctoral  seminar  in  accounting  (K.U.Leuven)  and the  seminar  of behavioral 
research (Durbuy, 2002) for their helpful comments and suggestions. 1.  Introduction 
Price setting is a crucial but complex task for managers (Gijsbrechts, 1993). 
Managers are less than perfectly informed about future demand and need to rely on 
some form of  cost-plus pricing, for which good accounting information is 
indispensable (Drury, 1997).  One of  the major problems to be solved is the 
allocation of  marketing costs and other fixed costs to units.  The still prevalent (Innes 
and Mitchel, 1995) volume-based cost allocation methods ignore cost heterogeneity 
across products and customers or segments.  The resulting cost reports are biased, 
unreliable in terms of  pricing decisions (Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998) and prone to 
cause dissatisfaction amount users (Foster and Gupta, 1994). Traditional systems 
produce biased cost figures because they use sales as the single volume driver.  They 
will lead companies to charge similar prices for all types of  customers (Shapiro, 
Rangan, Moriarty and Ross, 1987), even if  some are served at a loss.  High volume, 
standardized products (or easy to serve customers) are relatively overcosted, while 
low-volume, complex products (or difficult-to-serve customers) are relatively 
undercosted, leading to unsuitable pricing strategies (Cooper, 1988). 
One important debate currently taking place relates to whether Activity-Based 
Costing (ABC) systems provide incremental benefits compared with traditional 
accounting practices in managerial decision-making (Briers, Luckett and Chow, 
1997).  ABC assumes that product costs are caused by activities.  By using activity 
drivers as a basis for allocation, the actual resource consumption of  different products 
within a firm is more accurately reflected in the product cost (Kaplan and Cooper, 
1998). This more accurate cost information should result in superior product pricing 
strategies.  Similarly, Customer Profitability Analysis (CPA) can assist managers to 
set appropriately differentiated prices among customers or market segments that are 
heterogeneous in terms of  serving costs (Goebel, Marshali and Locander, 1998). 
Recent evidence suggests that the benefits of  ABC or CPA may have been 
overstated.  Managers do not only have costing information to rely on.  The business 
environment in which the firm and the decision maker operate offers potentially 
useful information (Waller, Shapiro and Sevcik, 1999).  By observing competitors it 
is possible to learn about their pricing behavior and results (Briers, Chow, Hwang and 
2 Luckett, 1999). Interacting with and observing customers makes it possible to identify 
the more costly products or market segments (Malmi, 1997). It has been argued that 
these natural sources of  information may to a certain extent substitute for accounting 
information (Bruns and McKinnon, 1993).  To the extent that there are alternatives for 
learning about costs and best managerial practice, the importance of the choice of  an 
information system may be sharply reduced. 
A limited number of  experimental accounting studies have contrasted costing 
systems with contextual information. The value-enhancing effects of  ABC depend on 
a firm's reward structure (Drake, Haka and Ravenscroft, 1999), on the complexity of 
the environment (Gupta and King, 1997; Cardinaels, Roodhooft and Warlop, 2000), 
and on the nature of  the competition. Callahan and Gabriel (1998) proved that more 
accurate cost signals do not have any benefit when duopoly firms compete on the 
basis of  price competition. We will build on their findings and investigate whether 
and when value-enhancing effects of  ABC are obtained in a competitive environment 
in which decision makers have to differentiate prices across market segments. 
2.  Price strategies and the role of accounting information and market feedback. 
With limited information about the parameters of  cost and demand functions 
available to the decision maker, cost-plus pricing is procedurally rational (Noble and 
Gruca, 1999) and it is widespread in business practice (Drury & Tayles 2000; Shim 
and Sudit, 1995; Noble and Gruca, 1999). There has been a long line of  accounting 
experiments investigating the effects of  traditional absorption compared with variable 
costing information on pricing decisions (Ashton, 1976; Barnes and Webb, 1986; 
Dyckman, Hoskin and Swieringa, 1982; Hilton, Swieringa & Turner, 1988; Waller, 
Shapiro & Sevcik, 1999). The major limitation of  this research is that only one 
product was considered and cost allocation was therefore not an issue. Given that 
cost-plus pricing is typically applied to full costs and firms have several products in 
different markets (Shim and Sudit, 1995), the question of  how different full costing 
methods such as ABC and traditional systems affect pricing decisions seems 
opportune but has not received much attention (Foster and Gupta, 1994).  The 
accuracy of  the costing system would be especially important if  the decision maker 
had no other information available. Managers may learn from experience if  they 
3 receive feedback on the outcomes of  their decisions, but such learning is known to be 
difficult and slow (Brehmer 1980).  An illustrative experiment was reported by Briers 
et al. (1997). Participants in their study made production quantity decisions for two 
products. Those provided with garbled traditional cost information tended to fixate on 
unit costs and obtained poor results.  Participants in the ABC group were provided 
with actual cost figures and made close to optimal decisions.  Both groups received 
performance feedback and performance based rewards.  Regardless of  this, both 
groups relied heavily on the costing information and the differences between 
traditional information and ABC persisted. 
If  decision makers were to continue to rely solely on costing information to 
make decisions, even in the face of  other available and diagnostic information, 
adaptability would degenerate to  'functional fixation' (Ashton 1976). In reality, the 
cost-plus price derived from the cost allocation system is rarely adopted without 
amendments (Drury, 1997). In the Briers et al. study (1997), little information was 
available in the environment.  Real pricing decisions usually occur in competitive 
markets providing the decision maker with cues that can substitute for accounting data 
(Waller et aI.,  1999). Monitoring the actions and the performance of  these best 
performing firms provides relevant cues for decision-making. 
Briers et al. (1999) showed that participants receiving benchmark feedback (a 
trade association report about three best performing firms) together with a traditional 
distorted cost report and outcome feedback made closer to optimal product and 
pricing decisions compared with a control group receiving only outcome feedback 
and distorted cost data.  They were able to incorporate the competitor data and did not 
merely fixate on biased cost numbers.  Waller et ai. (1999) studied whether 
differences between absorption and variable costing persisted in a competitive price 
setting market. Low performance sellers apparently learned from the pricing choices 
of  other sellers. Given this opportunity to learn from market feedback, sellers revised 
their price offers towards an optimal level in a manner that compensated for 
absorption vs. variable costing. 
Christensen and Demski (1995) stated that if  the purpose of  the costing 
exercise is to improve the function of  a less than completely specified cost expression, 
4 the exercise is based on a cost-benefit test.  Both the Briers et al. (1999) and the 
Waller et al. (1999) studies seem to suggest that the contribution of  a costing system 
is limited: market feedback may to a large extent replace costly accounting 
information as a basis for pricing decisions.  However, Briers et al. (1999) did not 
compare cost accounting systems. In addition, participants received benchmark 
feedback (report of  best practice of  other players that played the game), but they did 
not engage in a market setting involving any interaction between competitors. Waller 
et al. (1999) did consider an environment with several competing sellers, but they 
considered just one product and consequently cost allocation was not an issue. In both 
studies feedback about competitors was always informative.  Briers et al. (1997) 
introduced information about hypothetical superior competitors.  Waller et al. 
included enough sellers to guarantee superior pricing decisions of  at least a few 
players.  In both studies accounting information was redundant. 
Both studies suggest not only that decision makers can learn from experience, 
but also that it may be hard to avoid using competitors' data in one's own pricing 
decisions if  they are available.  Salient competitor information tends to be used as a 
model and as a basis for comparison (Ferris and Mitchel, 1987, Frederickson, 1992). 
Frequently, feedback from competitors is not informative because they, too, have little 
knowledge of  market conditions. Evidence in real and laboratory markets seems to 
suggest that competitors do indeed act with limited information and rationality 
(Coughlan and Mantra1a, 1992). We will study the incremental value of  more accurate 
but less than perfect accounting (ABC) information compared with traditional 
accounting information in competitive environment, by manipulating the information 
value of  market feedback. Better accounting information may still be of  help when 
competitor behavior has low signal value. 
3.  Experimental setting and predictions 
We investigate a pricing decision task in a laboratory market consisting of 
decision makers playing against one competitor (duopoly) in two market segments. 
We add to the realism of  the task by giving every subject customer descriptions and 
total profit feedback. The two market segments are heterogeneous in terms of  costs, 
while the demand and cost functions in each are assumed to be stable.  Participants 
5 undertake multiple trials and receive market feedback on each trial.  Starting prices 
reflect an ecologically common distorted policy in which the market segment with the 
highest (lowest) cost-to-serve is often assigned the lowest (highest) price (Kaplan and 
Cooper 1998). We are deliberately starting from such a distorted pricing policy 
because this gives the decision maker ample room to improve. It also gives us the 
opportunity to study how market feedback and cost data can signal that the current 
distorted pricing policy needs adjustment.  The value of  information coming from the 
market is manipulated by contrasting a fully informed with a fully uninformed 
competitor. 
In a competitive environment, participants may be faced with a competitor 
who does not have any superior knowledge of  market demand and cost parameters. 
An uninformed competitor like this may therefore follow the subject's price choice 
within a random range. The market is unable to provide the decision maker with 
relevant information.  Fixating on accounting numbers (Briers et al., 1997) then gives 
an advantage to the decision maker provided with more accurate cost data. Although 
it ignores demand, ABC provides the decision maker with cost data corresponding to 
actual cost behavior in both market segments. Participants can discover that the 
current distorted price policy is not in line with the cost of  serving and learn much 
sooner to reverse the price pattern by charging higher (lower) prices for the high (low) 
cost-to-serve market. This should bring them closer to optimal profit performance. 
Participants with traditional information receive biased cost-to-serve data, suggesting 
that the actual low cost-to-serve market is in fact more costly. Fixating on biased costs 
slows down learning, leading to similar price distortions as the pricing policy initially 
adopted in subsequent decision making. This leads to following hypothesis: 
Hi:  When the market is uninformative, providing decision makers with ABC 
data will result in closer to optimal price setting and higher performance 
levels. 
In a competitive environment, decision makers can also be faced with a 
competitor informed about market parameters. Such a competitor has knowledge of 
both demand and cost parameters which enables him to set optimal prices, taking into 
account the participants' price choices.  Due to the presence of  a salient competitor, 
6 participants are more likely to engage in social learning in which they successfully 
imitate their competitor (Frederickson, 1992). This should result in superior 
performance. Learning occurs here by comparing decisions with available signals 
from competitors. Accounting information is therefore made redundant (Briers et aI., 
1999; Waller et aI., 1999) because dominant cues available from the competition 
inform both participants with ABC and traditional information that the current pricing 
policy should be changed. This in turn has a positive effect on attaining the optimal 
state. The following hypothesis is formulated: 
H2:  When the market is informative, the cost accounting system does not 
contribute to the setting of prices and the resultant performance will be 
similar. 
When decision makers are faced with an informed competitor, performance in 
terms of  learning to reverse the distorted price pattern and closeness to optimal 
performance levels should be better. An informed competitor applies economic theory 
taking into consideration all market parameters. Decision makers imitating this price 
model incorporate demand and cost parameters into their price choices. Benchmark 
feedback therefore provides more relevant information, leading subjects to higher 
levels of  performance (Iselin, 1996). When market feedback is uninformative, 
participants rely on accounting feedback. The performance may be expected to be 
much lower. First of  all, an accounting report only contains information on costs (in 
the traditional case this is even a biased insight) and nothing on demand. It provides 
fewer relevant signals, leading to lower performance (Iselin, 1996). Secondly, the 
competitor provides irrelevant information, which may adversely affect the quality of 
the decision taken. This leads us to following hypothesis: 
H3:  Participants operating in an informative market learn to reverse the 
distorted price pattern more effectively and achieve closer to optimal 
performance compared with participants working in an uninformative 
market. 
7 4.  Experiment 
4.1. Experimental market environment 
Subjects compete against one competitor (modeled by the computer) on the 
basis of  prices in an experimentally defmed enviromnent consisting of  two market 
segments, A and B. A typical Bertrand demand function for differentiated products -
e.g. products with differing brand names - was defined for each market segment' 
(Callahan & Gabriel, 1998): 
fors =A,B  (1) 
where Qis is the quantity of  the product demanded for firm i, Pis is the price 
choice by firm i in market segment s (subject), Pjs is the price choice by firmj 
(computer), Us (us>O) is the demand in segment s when both firms charge zero prices 
and vs, ws (vs, ws> 0 and vs > ws) are fixed parameters for each segment s derived 
from the inverse demand function2• Table 1 shows parameteru, defined in such a way 
that market segment A is a high volume market while B is a low volume market. An 
important assumption for learning from benchmark feedback is that the situations 
being compared are similar (Frederickson, 1992). Therefore both firms face the same 
non-linear cost function within each market segment. The cost is defmed as a second-
degree function of  output: 
for s = A,B  (2) 
where fs is the fixed cost for market segment s, and where ys and zs are fixed 
slope parameters. The parameters of  the cost function are chosen such that the market 
segments are heterogeneous in terms of  cost. Table 1 shows that market A is a high 
cost-to-serve market because it has a much higher fixed cost (parameter f) and 
I We assume that parallel trade from market segment A to B is not possible (markets are separated). 
2 We set v, > w, to make the firm's own price demand effect stronger than the competitor's cross-price 
demand effect. In our Bertrand demand function v =I/b(1-s2) en w=s/b(1-s2); where b is the slope and 
s is the degree of  substitutability between the products offrrm i andj of  the inverse demand function: 
Pi=a-bQi-sbQi (Callahan & Gabriel, 1998). Given the values ofv and w (see Table 1), we can derive 
sand b. In our example, market A has a higher degree of  substitutability. (sA=0.367> sB=0.25) and a 
shallower slope of  the inverse demand function (hA=O.385 < bB =0.888). 
8 because costs increase with larger amounts as output increases (parameters y and z). 
Consequently, market A incurs more costs than market B per unit of  production. As 
market A has a high cost-to-serve, it requires higher prices in order to recover its 
costs.  Market B allows for lower prices because its cost per unit of  production is 
lower. However, at the beginning of  the experiment, as matter of  deliberate 
distortion, a slightly higher price for market B was charged compared with market A 
which was not in line with the actual cost of  serving. This enabled us to test whether 
participants are able to learn that the current price policy needs adjustment. 
Table 1: Parameters for the demand and cost functions in each market segment 
DEMAND  COST 
Segment A  SegmentB  Segment A  SegmentB 
u  5500  2250  f  1750000  700000 
v  3.0  1.2  Y  220  195 
w  1.1  0.3  z  0.22  0.14 
In this market environment, prices determine the quantity demanded which in 
tum determines costs. Therefore the firm's profit objective function can be written in 
terms of  price choices and takes the following form: 
4.2. Experimental Design 
Two factors were manipulated orthogonally and between sUbjects. The first 
factor was the value of  information available from the market. After each trial, 
participants received a report from the competitor, who was facing similar market 
conditions, in which his price choices and corresponding total profit were indicated. 
Half of  the subjects received informative market feedback from a superior 
competitor, fully informed about market demand and cost parameters, while the other 
half  were provided with uninformative market feedback, modeled as a competitor 
with no knowledge of  market parameters. The competitor (programmed by the 
computer) always moved second after participants had made their price choice. The 
competitor with complete insight into demand and cost parameters relating to the 
market is programmed to set an optimal price following economic theory, given a 
9 subject's price choice. Such a strategy results in superior performance because the 
competitor maximizes profits at the expense of  a participant's profit. The competitor's 
optimal price reaction given the subject's price choice can be calculated by solving the 
first order condition (maximizing firmj's profit given Pi): 
Pjs =  (2 UsVsZs + Us + VsYs ) + (2 VsWsZs + ws) Pis 
2(vs +v/  zs) 
(4) 
The feedback from the market is informative because it provides the decision 
maker with cues regarding optimal behavior incorporating demand and cost effects. 
Learning occurs here by comparing own profits against the superior competitor 
benchmark. 
The uninformed competitor was programmed to follow a participant's price 
choice within a random range. The overall performance of  such a strategy is not 
superior to the performance achieved by the participant imitated. The competitor's 
random price reaction is calculated as an equation (5), with the parameter 'a' set at 2%, 
which means that the competitor's price lies somewhere between 98% and 102% of  a 
subject's price choice: 
Pjs = [(1 ± a)% Pis]  (5) 
Due to random responses, the feedback received from the market is 
uninformative.  Given the fact that decision makers' knowledge of  market parameters 
is also limited, they are more likely to apply cost-plus pricing strategies. Here more 
accurate cost figures can make a difference because they reveal accounting numbers 
closely representing the actual cost to serve. 
The second factor was the cost report.  Half of  the participants received ABC 
information (containing activity drivers) showing unit cost figures closely 
approximating actual cost-to-serve differences among market segments. The system 
used a two-stage procedure (Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998) in which the total real cost 
was first allocated to three marketing activity drivers, namely ordering, delivery and 
custom set-up. In the second stage the cost of  each activity was allocated across the 
10 two market segments using these activity drivers. Market A required a lot more of 
these activities than market B, rendering it more costly to serve per unit. This 
corresponds to our assumed underlying reality. The other half  received traditional 
accounting numbers allocating fixed costs based on overall sales volume across 
segments.  In a traditional cost report, total actual costs are allocated to the two 
market segments using sales-volume as a driver. This driver is unable to differentiate 
effectively between the cost of  servicing both market segments, resulting in a biased 
cost picture on market segment level.  Appendix B shows how both ABC and 
traditional systems allocate real cost incurred to the two market segments. The unit 
cost information in the ABC system is a better approximation of  the actual cost per 
unit of  servicing each market. 
4.3. Experimental procedures 
Participants were recruited from an undergraduate cost accounting course at a 
large West European university. The course had covered the differences between 
ABC and traditional systems and had dealt with some Activity-Based Management 
issues such as applying ABC for customer or segment profitability analysis. A total of 
131  students3 completed the task on the computer. Subjects were randomly assigned 
to the four experimental conditions when entering the PC room.  Each session lasted 
one hour. To increase motivation, subjects were notified in advance that the four best 
players would receive a gift coupon4 for books or CDs worth the equivalent of 
approximately € 20. 
Before beginning the experimental task, the participants saw a few computer 
screens describing the target company and their task. The target company was 
described as an importer of  portable computers of  a particular brand. The PCs were 
bought directly from the manufacturer and distributed by the company in two market 
segments. Market A consists of  small PC shops, while market B covers business 
clients. In order to induce prior cost knowledge, participants were expressly told that 
both markets had different cost structures. The cost of  goods sold in market A was 
3 The cell with traditional information and uninformative market feedback contained 32 participants, 
the three other cells each consisted of  33 participants. 
4 In reality, we rewarded the best player in each of  our four experimental conditions with a coupon. 
11 lower than in market B, but customers in market A ordered more frequently, and were 
more demanding with respect to service and delivery than the customers in market B. 
Participants were told that they were playing against a competing distributor of  a 
different brand, operating in the same markets and facing similar cost structures. In 
case of  uninformative market feedback, this competitor was described as a new 
market player, while in the other scenario he was introduced as an established market 
player. 
The purpose of  the task was to set selling prices for PCs within each market 
segment in order to maximize profitability. A price bracketS of  between € 1100 and € 
2200 was established. The target company's current price strategy was € 1650 for 
market A and €171 0 for market B, which was not in line with the actual cost of 
serving the two market segments. Each subject had ten trials at their disposal to 
decide on prices in order to improve performance. After each decision, a cost report 
(ABC versus traditional) and a report on the competitor's price choices and his profit 
performance (random versus optimal price strategy) were issued to participants. The 
subject's price choices and total profits recorded for the last five trials, together with 
those of  the competitor, remained on the screen. After the tenth trial, the task 
automatically finished and subjects received an exit questionnaire containing several 
items (on a five-point scale), checking motivation amongst other things. Participants 
were all highly motivated (average: 4.22) and more importantly, no difference was 
detected between the accounting report type (F(l,127): 0.01; p > .92) and the 
competitor's price strategy (F(1,127):  0.72;  p > .40). 
5.  Results 
A small number of  participants experimented in a limited number of  trials with 
the upper and lower limits of  our constraints. For example, they would charge the 
lowest possible price (1100) for market A and the highest possible price (2200) for 
market B.  Testing these extreme values resulted in profits far from the general trend. 
Neither the accounting systems, nor the different market feedback conditions, nor the 
starting values, indicate that these extremes would be appropriate as a pricing policy. 
5 This was done in order to ensure that quantities demanded remained positive at all times, given the 
competitor's price choice. 
12 In 17 (1.3%) of  the 1310 triaVparticipants observations (10 trials for 131 participants), 
an upper or lower limit was charged to one or two market segments. These data points 
are considered as outliers and are left out of  subsequent analyses.  In the first part of 
the results section we analyze whether the experimental factors influenced the 
learning process of  the decision makers.  In the second part we look at the 
consequences for performance. 
5.1. Learning to reverse the price pattern 
We introduced a biased price policy at the beginning of  the experiment in the 
sense that prices were not in line with the cost of  serving. Although market A incurred 
far more costs than market B, the initial price for market A was lower than for market 
B (Pa < Pb). Reaching the optimal state required a reversal in the pricing policy (pa > 
Pb).  For market A, a significant upward price adjustment was needed, while market 
B required a considerable downward adjustment.  We tested whether participant 
learning was influenced by the nature of  market feedback and the cost report.  The 
following logistic regression was estimated: 
where LEARN was 0 if  the price for market A was lower than for market B 
(pa < Pb) and I otherwise (pa > Pb), for each triaVparticipant observation n (n=1293). 
Besides the influence of  accounting system A (0 for traditional and 1 for ABC), 
market feedback M (0 for uninformative and I for informative) and their interaction 
AM on learning, we also expected that reversing the price pattern would become more 
likely as a decision maker gained experience with the experimental task. Therefore we 
added cumulative experience reflected by the trial number T (T=I, 2, ...  , 10) to the 
model (Gupta & King, 1997). 
Table 2 shows the results ofthe logistic regression. Panel A shows that when 
market feedback was uninformative, participants provided with ABC were more 
likely to reverse the price pattern compared with participants with traditional 
information (HI). When the market feedback was informative, accounting 
information made no difference as regards learning, as was predicted by H2. However 
13 in this situation, people were much more like to reverse the initial price pattern, 
compared with participants receiving uninformative market feedback (H3), due to the 
more relevant nature of  the cues from the competitor as opposed to accounting data. 
Table 2: Results of  the logistic regression 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
TRAD  ABC 
Market Uninformative 
% of  observations where Pa> Pb 




% of  observations where Pa > Pb 
trial/participant observations (n) 
96.96% 
329 
Panel B: logistic regression results 
futercept 
Account. System (A) 






estimate  p-value 
-2.9123  0.0001 
1.5478  0.0001 
5.1972  0.0001 
-1.7415  0.0003 








estimate  p-value 
-2.7423  0.0001 
1.5185  0.0001 




estimate  p-value 
1.5932  0.0004 
-0.1963  0.6594 
0.4767  0.0001 
0.0001 
Participants also gained experience during the task. As the number of  trials 
increased, a subject was more likely to charge higher prices for market A compared 
with market B. The model with all observations in Panel B of  Table 2 indicates that 
the effects are all significant, thereby confirming our hypotheses. Simple effects tests 
indicated that the effect of  the 'accounting system' was indeed significant in the 
'uninformative market feedback' condition, thereby reinforcing HI. However, the 
variable accounting system was not significant when the subset 'informative market 
feedback' only was taken into consideration, thereby confirming H2. 
5.2. The effect on profit performance 
In this section we analyze how the different experimental factors affect profit 
performance. We take the relative distance from optimal profit (%dev.n*) as the 
14 dependent variable6. Besides the main effects of  accounting system (A), market 
feedback (M) and their interaction (AM), we expect people to improve over time. 
Again cumulative experience reflected by trial number T was added to our model. The 
following regression was tested: 
Table 3 shows the results of  this regression. The model with all observations 
in panel B shows that the variable 'accounting system' is significant while the 
interaction term (AM) is not. This indicates that ABC has additional value when 
market feedback is both informative and uninformative. However, our hypothesis 
maintained that better accounting information would only have additional benefit (in 
terms of  closeness to optimal profit) when market feedback was uninformative (HI) 
and not when it was informative (H2). Further analysis on each of  the subsets 
indicates that the accounting system is less significant when playing against an 
informed competitor compared with playing against an uninformed competitor, 
indicating that here ABC seems to have less value?  The figure in panel A also seems 
to indicate that the value of  ABC is much smaller when the informative market 
feedback is available. However, this type of  feedback is not a complete substitute for 
better accounting data, as H2 had predicted. 
The 'market feedback' factor is highly significant in our profit model. When 
market feedback is informative, all participants are much closer to optimal profit 
(H3). An informed competitor is able to apply economic theory incorporating demand 
and cost effects. Participants applying this benchmark to their own firm will therefore 
achieve a better profit performance. In the case of  uninformative feedback, finding the 
optimal state is much more difficult because only cost information is available and the 
irrelevant behavior of  the competitor might adversely affect profit performance. 
6 %dev.1I* n =  (11*- 11  n)/1I*  where 11*  is the optimal profit and 11  n is the profit recorded for each trial/ 
participant observation n.  Given the fact that maximum achievable profitability fluctuates within an 
interval due to the random responses of  the competitor in the case of  uninformative market feedback 
(see appendix A), we take the upper limit of  this interval as 11*. 
7 Similar inferences can be made from the semi-partial correlation r2 as a measure of  effect size. It 
indicates that the variable accounting system (A) explains more of  the variance in profits when 
market feedback is uninformative (rAce. syst  =  0.01253) compared with the case where market 
feedback is informative (rAee.syst =  0.00693). 
15 Finally, the trial number is highly significant in all our models. Even in the worst-case 
scenario, adjustments are apparently not random. Subjects still move closer to optimal 
profit indicating that they improve with experience. Learning also occurs via total 
profit feedback. 
Table 3: OLS regression results on the dependent variable %dev. n* 




0.2  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  Trial 
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Panel B: OLS regression results on the model with dependent variable %dev.n* 
Intercept 
Account. System (A) 







Estimate  p-value 
0.3705  0.0001 
-0.0332  0.0006 
-0.2306  0.0001 
0.0167  0.2156 





estimate  p-value 
0.3718  0.0001 
-0.0332  0.0038 





estimate  p-value 
0.1386  0.0001 
-0.0165  0.0235 
-0.0118  0.0001 
0.0001 
0.1222 
We also analyzed the relative distance against optimal prices as a dependent 
variable in each market segment. In this way, we were able to identify which price 
differences are responsible for the differences in profits obtained. The following 
additional explanatory regression models were tested: 
16 %dev.Pa*n  8 = bo + bl A + b2 M + B3 AM + B4 T 
%dev.Pb*n= bo + bl A + b2 M + B3 AM + B4 T 
When the market feedback was uninformative, incremental benefits of  ABC 
can be explained by price differences in both markets. The figure in panel A of  Table 
4 indicates that prices in both market A and B were closer to optimal prices. Analysis 
of  the 'uninformative market feedback' subset indicated that accounting system had a 
significant impact for both price models (see panel Band C of  Table 4). More 
accurate cost data provided the decision maker with additional information resulting 
in closer to optimal prices in both market segments. 
ABC also proved a slight advantage when informative market feedback was 
presented. The figure in panel A of  Table 4 shows that this small additional benefit 
can only be explained by price differences in market B. In fact, the accounting report 
type was not significant in the model with Pa (see panel B of  Table 4). Here all 
decision makers improved by following the dominant benchmark provided by the 
competitor, regardless of  the quality of  the accounting information. However, the 
report type is significant in the price model Pb. People with traditional information are 
further away from the optimal price for market B compared with participants 
receiving ABC. The reason why participants with traditional information perform 
worse only in this market can be found in the displayed unit cost. The traditional 
scenario displayed a unit cost of  around € 1450 in segment B. Although they followed 
the competitor by lowering the price for market B, participants did not completely 
ignore their cost data. They did not want to go below the 'psychological' cost limit of 
€1450, because then their accounting system would display a loss. In reality market B 
is at this level still profitable, and the optimal price was even considerably lower 
(€ 1362). Participants with ABC received a more accurate and lower unit cost for 
market B and continued to follow their competitor in market B, thereby moving much 
closer to the optimal price levd. We infer that if  a traditional system had produced a 
8  %dev.Pa*D  =  abs(pa*- Pa.)lPa*  and  %dev.Pb*D  =  abs(Pb*- Pb.)/Pb* where Pa*  and  Pb*  are  the 
optimal prices and PaD and PbD  are the prices actually charged for each trial! participant observation 
n. The absolute value is taken because prices higher or lower than optimal are possible. 
9  The  average  Pb  over  the  10  trials  for  participants  receiving  traditional  information  is  €1473.7, 
indicating that many participants did not go  below their biased cost figure.  Participants receiving 
ABC had an average Pb of €1396.9.  They therefore  achieved higher profits because they moved 
closer to the optimal price in market B. 
17 smaller unit cost figure in market B, differences in the accounting report type for this 
market would have disappeared. 
Table 4: Regression results for the dependent variables %dev.Pa* and %dev.Pb* 
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-+-TRAD  uninform  -ill-TRAD  inform 
-.-ABCJininform  ~  A BCJiiform 
-+-TRAD  uninform -ill-TRAD  inform 
-.-ABCjininform  ~  ABCJiiform 
Panel B: OLS regression results for the model with dependent variable %dev.Pa* 
All observations  Market uninfonnative  Market infonnative 
(n=1293)  (n=636)  (n=657) 
estimate  E-value  estimate  E:value  estimate  E-value 
Intercept  0.l578  0.0001  0.1613  0.0001  0.0602  0.0001 
Account. System (A)  -0.0153  0.0001  -0.0152  0.0002  -0.0014  0.4906 
Market Feedback (M)  -0.0941  0.0001 
Interaction (AM)  0.0138  0.0021 
Trial (T)  -0.0046  0.0001  -0.0052  0.0001  -0.0040  0.0001 
p-value model  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 
R-sguare  0.5635  0.0978  0.0158 
Panel C: OLS regression results on the dependent variable %dev.Pb* 
Intercept 
Account. System (A) 







estimate  p-value 
0.l992  0.0001 
-0.0226  0.0001 
-0.0793  0.0001 
-0.0100  0.2269 





estimate  E-value 
0.1785  0.0001 
-0.0226  0.0001 






estimate  E-value 
0.1397  0.0001 
-0.0326  0.0001 
-0.0094  0.0001 
0.0001 
0.1528 6.  Discussion 
Our experiment demonstrated that the benefits of  ABC compared with 
traditional volume-based cost methods depend on the information value of  market 
feedback. ABC had incremental value when market feedback was uninformative. 
ABC provided the decision maker with more accurate cost figures, which positively 
affected his or her learning and performance in terms of  adjusting the decision process 
in the appropriate direction. Pricing decisions for participants receiving ABC were 
closer to optimal price levels, resulting in higher profitability compared with decision 
makers basing their price choices on biased cost information. In the case of 
informative market feedback, the benefits of  ABC became mostly redundant. 
Although ABC still resulted in a profit advantage in one market segment, participants 
with biased cost data performed as well as people with ABC in terms of  adjusting a 
distorted decision-making process in the right direction. The pricing choices of  a well-
informed competitor provided the necessary diagnostic information suitable for 
achieving performance improvement. Informative market feedback acted as a 
substitute for more accurate cost. What is more, when market feedback was 
informative, a decision maker's performance was much closer to optimal 
performance. 
In our current design, the competitor was either fully informed or uninformed 
about the characteristics of  the market environment. Follow-up studies could model 
competitors applying cost plus pricing. Improving the accuracy of  one's own cost 
information would be less interesting if  the decision maker were to compete against a 
competitor who has access to more accurate cost data. This better informed 
competitor might be considered as a benchmark for the decision maker's own firm. 
On the other hand, improving the cost system might still generate a competitive 
advantage when competitors use biased cost figures for price setting. Here ABC 
would provide the decision maker with more accurate insights into the market 
environment, leading to improvements in decision-making. 
In this study, participants played against a competitor whose behavior was pre-
programmed.  It would be interesting for future research to increase the dynamics by 
playing subjects off  against each other. A player with biased or more accurate cost 
19 information can be faced with one (or mUltiple) player(s) having biased or ABC 
information. Human competitors might often use irrational strategies, which do not 
occur when facing a programmed and thus consistent competitor. This makes learning 
from market feedback much more difficult. Investigating the role of  ABC in these 
multi-period competitive environments is indeed an unexplored research area in 
accounting (Callahan & Gabriel, 1998) and deserves further investigation. 
Although the current study did not incorporate the cost of  implementing ABC, 
it still provides useful results for managers considering adopting ABC. Given the 
costly implementation procedure, it is more worthwhile undertaking an ABC exercise 
when competitors are known to be less informed. As the market becomes increasingly 
informative (e.g. more players that implement cost system refinements), investing in 
an expensive cost system seems less useful because one has the opportunity to 
compare performance against better-informed competitors. Future research should 
continue to investigate when, how and why the benefits of  ABC occur in the light of 
alternative sources of  information. Besides informative feedback from superior 
competitors, other factors may moderate the value of  ABC. 
Managers often have informal knowledge on the market environment in which 
they operate via interaction with customers, daily informal reports, feedback about the 
production process, their personal management experience, or mere intuition. 
Managers may consider these sources of  information highly diagnostic and substitute 
them for accurate accounting information as well as for garbled cost information. 
However, just like formal accounting sources, these informal sources of  information 
about customers or products are often incomplete or even incorrect. Rational 
managers should weigh the validity of  cost accounting information and various 
informal sources, and base their decisions on the most valid source. A fascinating 
subject for future research is whether and when they actually do. 
20 APPENDIX A 
In this appendix we derive the best response for a participant in each market feedback 
condition. In this way we can derive the maximum achievable profit level for each 
condition. The profit function is expressed as follows: 
nis = Pi (us-vsPj + Ws Pi) - ys(us-vsPj + wsPi) - zs(us-vsPj + wsPii -fs  (AI) 
If  market feedback is informative, the competitor sets following competitive price: 
Pjs = (2  UsVsZs + Us + vsYs) + (2 VsWsZs  + W s) Pis 
2(vs + v;  Zs) 
(Al) 
Substituting (A2) for (AI) results in a profit function written entirely in terms ofh 
Subsequently solving the first order equation, the following optimal best response is 
obtained for firm i, which maximizes the participant's profits. 
Pis = ms - ns Ys - 2 zsmsns 
2ns (zs ns - I) 
ms =[us +ws(2 usvszs+us + vSYs)]  andns~  [W/(2VsZs +12-vs]  (A3) 
2(vs + v/z,)  2(vs + v/zs) 
When market feedback is uninformative, the competitor sets following random price: 
Pjs = [(1 ± a)% Pi']  On average:  2:  ~  = Pi' 
11=1  n 
(A4) 
This competitor actually follows the participant. Substituting (A4) for (AI), the profit 
function can be written entirely in terms ofPj. Subsequently solving the first order 
equation, the following best response will maximize profitability: 
Pis = Us + Vs  Ys - WsYs + 2usvszs-2uswszs 
2 (vs - ws+ v/z, -2vswsz, + zswh 
(A5) 
Table Al displays the optimal prices and corresponding maximum profits for each 
market feedback condition. The competitor's arbitrary responses if  the market is 
uninformative cause fluctuation in the subject's maximum profits. 
Table AI: optimal prices and maximum profitability 










This appendix shows how costs actually incurred over both market segments are 
allocated to the different market segments using ABC or traditional accounting 
information. We only show the analysis for the setting in which market feedback is 
uninformative.  The analysis of  the setting with informative feedback is similar. At 
the beginning of  the experiment, the target firm charged a price of € 1650 for market 
A and € 1710 for market B. Table Al shows a random response of  the competitor and 
the actual results in terms of  the profit achieved by the decision maker's own firm. 
The price pattern charged by the decision maker's own firm is not in line with the cost 
of  serving, in the sense that market A is actually more costly to serve than market B, 
which is not reflected in the prices (see Table BI): 
Table B 1: The initial price policy and corresponding actual results 
Firm i  Competitor 
Pa  1650  1635 
Pb  1710  1740 
Profits and actual unit costs for firm i 
Segment A  margin  SegmentB  margin  Total  margin 
Sales Volume  2349  720  3069 
Price  1650  1710 
Revenue  3875850  1231200  5107050 
Cost  3480696  89.8%  912976  74.2%  .:,i~~S~~~~!~i;  86.0% 
Profit  395154  10.2%  318224  25.8%  713378  14.0% 
Cost/unit  1481.78  1268.02 
We assume that part of  the actual cost incurred over the two markets (4393672, see 
shaded area in Table B I) is in fact the cost of  goods sold. Products are imported at a 
fixed price and each imported product is in fact also sold. In our setting, the import 
price for market B is slightly higher than that for market A: 
Cost of  goods sold (COS)  = 659.35 * Qa + 694.8 * Qb 
= 659.35 * 2349 + 694.8 * 720 = 2049069 
The remaining part of  total actual cost incurred (4393672 - 2049069 =  2344603), 
defined here as customer costs, is allocated to the two market segments using different 
cost accounting systems.  An ABC system uses a two-stage procedure to allocate this 
customer cost to market segments (see Table B2). In the first stage, costs are spread 
22 over three cost-to-serve activities - ordering, delivery and software installation - on 
the basis of  the time that each activity takes. In the second stage, the cost of  each 
activity is allocated to the market segments on the basis of  activity drivers. As Table 
B2 indicates, market A requires more activities (more orders, deliveries and custom 
design) in our experiment than market B.  Hence, market A incurs more costs per unit, 
corresponding to economic reality (see unit cost in panel B of  Table B2). 
Table B2: Underlying assumptions in the ABC condition and the ABC report 
Panel A: assumptions of  the ABC system 
Stage 1: Allocating cost to activities 
% oftime 
Order processing  35 % 
Software installation  40 % 
Delivery  25% 
Panel B: ABC report 
Segment A 
Sales Volume  2349 
Price  1650 
Revenues  3875850 
Cost of  goods sold  1548813 
Customer Costs  2038315 
Driver rate  Drivervol. 
Order process.  2075  352 
Softw. Install.  150  5403 
DeliveQJ.  3033  164 
Profits  288722 









Stage 2: Activity drivers for each market segment 
Activity level per 100 units 
Segment A  Segment B 
No Orders  15  6 
No licenses  230  120 
SegmentB  margin  Total  Margin 
720  3069 
1710 
1231200  5107050 
500256  40.6%  2049069  40.1% 
306288  24.9%  2344603  45.9% 
Drivervol.  Costs  Drivervol.  Costs 
43  89623  395  820611 
864  129302  6267  937841 
29  87363  193  586151 
424656  34.5%  713378  14.0% 
1120.20 
In a traditional accounting report, customer costs are allocated to the two market 
segments using sales volume as a driver. By using this driver, it can be seen from 
Table B3, that market B is a high cost-to-serve market per unit, which is due to the 
fact that the cost of  the goods sold on market B is slightly higher. Sales as a cost 
driver is unable to differentiate between the cost of  servicing the two market 
segments. 
Table B3: Traditional cost report 
Segment A  ma~in  SegmentB  margin  Total  Margin 
Sales Volume  2349  720  3069 
Price  1650  1710 
Revenues  3875850  1231200  5107050 
Cost of  goods sold  1548813  40.0%  500256  40.6%  2049069  40.1% 
Customer Costs  1794550  46.3%  550053  44.7%  2344603  45.9% 
Profits  532487  13.7%  180891  14.7%  713378  14.0% 
Unit Costs  1423.31  1458.76 
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